This paper is a first attempt to disentangle, theoretically and empirically, the hedging of input and output risk. We present a simple illustrative model which shows that input and output hedging are very different policies, in particular if firms are in non-competitive product markets. We show that in an oligopolistic setting, output hedging is detrimental to firms, whereas input hedging is not.
I Introduction and literature review
This paper provided a simple illustrative model which suggests that input and output hedging may have very different consequences for firms depending on market structure. In particular, we show that in an oligopolistic setting, output hedging may destroy rents and lead to lower profits. This leads to our empirical work which is based upon a sample of hedging firms from 2001 to 2005. We are able to identify what risks companies hedge for, and we use empirical proxies for input vs. output risk. Our empirical analysis is consistent with the model. We observe that firms with high market power tend to hedge more against their input price risk rather than output price risk.
In general, investors should not want firms to hedge risks, which shareholders can usually hedge much easier and cheaper by their own by portfolio choices and in various derivative markets. 2 The literature proposes several motives, related to various market frictions, which can make hedging an optimal policy for an individual business entity. A well-known paper by Froot et al. (1993) justifies hedging as a way of avoiding costly external financing. Thus hedging enables the firm to take advantage of profitable 2 This can be easily understood by the following extreme example. Suppose that two firms produce the same product, and their revenue can be either $50 or $150 with equal probabilities. Suppose further that the revenue streams are perfectly negatively correlated. The firm can pay an insurance company to guarantee $100 in all states by paying the $50 in the good state to cover the $50 shortfall in the bad state. Suppose the insurance company charges $3. Then investors are guaranteed $97. However, it should be obvious that just by buying the two stocks investors can guarantee $100 x 2 in all states on their own, without paying the $3. Or, of course, they can just buy treasuries. Thus, as long as investors can create portfolios relatively cheaply, firms should not hedge. The other important issue is incentives. Clearly, if the outcome is guaranteed regardless of managerial effort, managers will not put in any effort. Whatever for? This does not apply to hedging input exposure, which is exogenous to the firm. investment opportunities. Smith and Stulz (1985) identify and model three such frictions, namely, taxes, bankruptcy costs, and managerial risk aversion. Much of the theoretical and empirical literature focuses on possibly sub-optimal managerial hedging motives.
Managers may want to hedge when they have too much of their wealth invested in their own companies. Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that managers diversify their own risky position via conglomerate mergers. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) focus on another possible set-up, which can lead managers to take too little risk, namely, the presence of asymmetric information coupled with career concerns. If a manager knows that he will be judged on performance alone, and his efforts will remain unobservable, he may be tempted to over hedge. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) show that when managers cannot hedge effectively, they may choose inferior projects, which are less risky (propositions 10, 11). 3 Managers can lower the risk stemming from production uncertainty in two ways. One is by using hedging instruments (such as derivatives) and the other is by the sub-optimal choice of projects.
The latter is much more difficult to detect and monitor (who can tell which projects the manager might have taken). Only one paper to date (Ravid and Basuroy, 2004) considers that perspective empirically. Ravid and Basuroy, (2004) , show that movie industry executives choose sub-optimal, low risk projects. In particular, they find that studios produce very violent films which are less risky by several measures even though they do not provide the highest return. Most empirical work, however, focuses on overall firm behavior, but quite a few papers conclude that managerial motives drive hedging decisions.
A study by Tufano (1996) of the gold-mining industry seems to confirm that corporate officers do engage in hedging their own production. He finds that almost all firms in the gold mining industry employ some form of hedging in gold-derivative markets. He detects no correlation between hedging and measures of bankruptcy costs. However, he does find a significant relationship between hedging measures and proxies for risk exposure of executives. Tufano (1996) also tests several other theories. He cannot find support for the theory in Froot et al. (1993) . However, Houshalter (2000), who studies the hedging behavior of oil and gas producers, does find a correlation between leverage related variables and the fraction of production hedged, which he interprets as supporting the financial contracting cost hypothesis. There is little support in his study for tax proxies and mixed support for managerial risk aversion proxies, mainly the structure of compensation.
A study of the mutual funds industry by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) also discovers seemingly sub-optimal risk management in response to incentives, which have to do with timing and age of the fund (see also Jin, 2002, where performance is tied, theoretically and empirically, to different types of risks faced by managers). 4 Adam, Dasgupta and Titman (2007) consider firms which can hedge future cash flows. These cash flows are later used for investment purposes. Hedging reduces the firm's expected production cost, but volatility of production costs provides a real option value to firms which do not hedge. The latter benefit depends on the number of firms that choose to hedge. Adam et al. show that in a Nash equilibrium (refined with sub-game perfection) identical firms may choose to hedge or not to hedge. Thus, industry structure and other variables may determine the proportion of firms that hedge. Our structure is simpler and does not consider more than two firms-but we focus on input and output hedging separately. The two papers however, optimal behavior on the part of managers (along the lines described here) if the firm carries some leverage.
share the empirical view that industry structure is an important determinant of hedging behavior. The gold mining industry remains a fertile testing ground-several recent papers run firms' hedging decisions proxied by use of derivatives on an extensive set of independent variables, and try to disentangle hedging from speculation. These papers Unlike previous work, in this paper we separate the types of risks hedged and analyze them separately. We find that this makes a significant difference both theoretically and empirically.
The paper continues as follows. Section II provides a simple illustrative market power model studying the impact of input and output hedging on corporate policies and firm value. Section III describes the hedging database and the econometric methodology we employ. We analyze the empirical results in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II Model
The purpose of the model is to show that input and output hedging create very different incentives, and that, further, the impact of hedging on profitability and corporate policies depends on market structure. We abstract from various other frictions which have previously been modeled such as taxes and bankruptcy costs, but we will of course consider them in the empirical analysis. We also assume away managerial agency issues, but again, we will consider them in the empirical analysis. In short, our model focuses on inputs versus outputs only.
Consider a very simple model with one output and one input. We assume that the input price, , and output price, , are random. q and k represent the output and input quantities.
F(k)
is the production function.
s.t. q < F(k)
For all states, is positive, thus at the optimum:
which implies that:
We can re-write the firm optimization problem:
We will assume risk neutrality throughout. This will simplify matters, but we will note in our results how risk aversion can affect our findings. It should be clear that in the absence of frictions, and if hedging is costless, hedging should be a matter of indifference for a risk neutral competitive firm. The purpose of the analysis below, however, is to show how hedging in non-competitive environments may lead to very detrimental effects.
Competitive Markets
We start with a short discussion of a benchmark case. Assume competitive markets, that the firm is a price taker and has so has no impact on either the input or output prices.
The FOC of the above problem will characterize the optimal solution:
If the firm is risk neutral, then hedging the price at the expected level will make no difference to the firm production decision. We can trivially prove this, but it should be obvious from the discussion.
Output Market Power
The interesting part of this illustration comes if we assume that the firm has output market power, for instance, as a monopoly or an oligopoly or a leading firm in a Stackelberg type situation. Naturally most firms of interest in the real work operate is in oligopolistic markets-monopolies are rarely observed in reality and the outcome is less interesting and obvious once we analyze the more complicated cases of oligopolies.
In oligopolistic markets, p is still stochastic due to a stochastic element in the demand function. The firm, however, now has some impact on the price, i.e., if it supplies more, the equilibrium price decreases. For example, in a Cournot market:
where θ is a random variable.
We will now prove a proposition regarding the consequences of hedging. We will also provide a numerical illustration to make the analysis more concrete. In order to simplify our oligopolistic environment we will make a few assumptions and definitions:
Definition 2:
Assumption 3: MC=0.
Assumption 4: In order to break ties, we will assume that firms will produce at a positive price and exit the market at a price of zero.
Assumption 3 is standard in simple illustrations of oligopolistic models (see Rasmussen, 2001 ) and it will serve us well here, in bringing out the intuition of the model.
The proposition below contains the crux of our story. We will use the terms insurance and hedging interchangeably. In general and in particular in this model, they serve the same purpose.
PROPOSITION 1

Assume any oligopolistic situation, i.e. a situation in which two firms compete in a market and split some rents. Assume further a rational insurer (a counter-party for hedging).
If one of the firms hedges output prices at any price greater than its marginal cost (by our assumption, MC=0)
, then the hedging firm will produce up to the point where the price reaches zero; the competing firm will be shut out of the market; no firm will make any rents, the insurer breaks even and consumers will be better off. The outcome is similar in the case where both firms hedge, except that then both firms will be producing and earning zero profits.
Proof:
Assume two firms, a and b. Depending on our assumed market structure, they split the rents in different ways (Cournot, Stackelberg are the most common cases and will be discussed below). If one of the firms is guaranteed a fixed price P for its output, P>MC=0, then it will produce until demand is exhausted. We will call this quantity, at which the demand curve intersects the horizontal axis, Q*. At that point, the market price of the good is zero.
Assume now that firm 2 chooses to stay in the market. It can offer to sell at some price φ, φ > 0. The quantity it can sell at that price is at most less than Q*. However, firm 1 will sell at any price, and thus this price φ cannot be an equilibrium price. Therefore, the equilibrium price will have to drop to zero and firm b will have to exit the market (see assumption 3).
The insurer is assumed to be rational, and thus will anticipate the behavior of the hedging firm. Thus it will charge PxQ* for the insurance and essentially pay it back to the firm after production has been completed.
Thus, the two firms will have lost all previous rents and the insurer will break even.
Consumers are better off because under any oligopoly model they would have been offered a quantity < Q* at a price higher than zero, whereas now they are offered Q* at a price of zero.
This outcome cannot be prevented in equilibrium because of time inconsistencyonce hedging is done, the hedging firm will find it optimal to produce as much as possible.
If two firms hedge, then we are into a Bertrand type competition at a price of zero.
Bertrand equilibrium generally assumes that firms split the market evenly and we will assume this here as well-however, as is the case in a general Bertrand equilibrium with fixed and equal marginal costs, any split of the market between the two firms will result in a similar outcome. Regardless of the split, both firms earn zero profits, as the insurer prices insurance rationally. The insurer breaks even, and consumers gain as in the previous case.
QED
Corollary 1:
Assume two identical oligopolistic markets. In one market, firms hedge output. In another they do not. Firms that hedge outputs are weakly less profitable than firm that do not hedge.
The proof is obvious from the discussion above. If both firms do not hedge, then they are both profitable. If one firm hedges, the other one will be driven out of the market, and the firm we observe will be making zero profits. If both firms hedge, then both are driven to zero profits.
We will now illustrate the proposition with a Stackelberg game example.
Example: A Stackelberg Game
We will use numerical values for clarity of exposition, but the results generalize easily.
In every Stackelberg game, there are two players, a leader and a follower. a is the leader, b is a follower.
We assume a simple linear demand function, P(Q) = 120+e -qa-qb. e is the only uncertain element E(e) = 0, and it makes demand stochastic. However, as the firms are assumed to be risk neutral, it will not play much of a role here.
As per assumption 3, MC =0.
In a Stackelberg game, the leader chooses a quantity and the follower maximizes profit given the leader's quantity. Thus, if the leader produces qa, then player b will produce:
We now substitute this quantity into the expected profit function of player a to obtain: ∏a = 120 qa -qa 2 -qa (60-qa /2).
Player a will maximize ∏a with respect to qa.
In our simple numerical example we obtain that qa = 60 and then qb =30 The equilibrium price is P= 30. The leader earns 1800 and the follower 900.
We now assume that the leader can hedge prices at the expected level, 30. This will simplify the example, but obviously hedging at any positive price will do.
The leader's optimal policy becomes to sell as many units as he can, thus it will essentially flood the market with 120 units 5 . The price will drop to 0 and at that price the follower (per assumption 3) will drop out of the market and lose all rents. Given a marginal cost of 0, the leader will then sell 120 units and at the guaranteed price and will make 3600.
b will be shut out. 6 Consider now the cost of insurance (hedging). Since the price drops to 0, the insurer will have to refund the entire 3600 to the leader, a. A rational insurer will demand 3600 upfront and the leader will end up with no profit. The insurer breaks even. There is no better solution, since the problem is time inconsistent. Once insurance is purchased, the agent will flood the market.
The only benefit accrues to consumers, who can now purchase 120 units at a price of 0 vs. 90 units at a price of 30 without hedging.
We should note that Stackelberg equilibrium in general does not explain why one agent is a leader and another is a follower. It is assumed. Therefore, if a follower hedges we essentially have to speculate how the equilibrium will evolve. One possibility is discussed below.
Suppose b hedges at 30 as well. In this case, the situation reverts to a Bertrand type competition. In a Bertrand equilibrium the parties are usually assumed to split the market.
In that case, each competitor makes 30x60 = 1800 and the insurance payment will be split as well, but the final outcome will be exactly the same-no producer makes money, the insurer breaks even and the consumers benefit. It is important to understand that the result generalizes to an increasing marginal cost case, except that then the outcome is less extreme.
In an appendix we discuss an example of a Cournot equilibrium, with similar outcomes.
We have shown so far that with rational players, hedging will cut profits in a market where the players have market power because of the adverse production incentives created. Clearly this discussion provides extreme examples and ignores other motives for hedging such as taxes or bankruptcy. However, the clear empirical implication is that firms
should not hedge outputs in less competitive markets and should they hedge, the market will punish their shares. On the other hand, in such a market we expect that consumers will be better off.
We have discussed a case in which prices are hedged, which is more common. Some work has assumed that firms can hedge their output directly, that is, be guaranteed a fixed amount of money regardless of what is actually produced. However, hedging contracts represent a specific amount of underlying assets, thus to be more precise, total output hedging means hedging at a certain price for a certain quantity. We discuss this in proposition 2. Proof: Assume that one firm in an oligopoly hedges its output. That is, it will receive a fixed amount F regardless of the price or quantity produced. Once insurance is purchased, a rational firm will produce 0 since the insurance company will make up the difference to F.
PROPOSITION 2
Again, assuming rational insurers, the insurance will require F upfront and the producing company will end up breaking even, as it pays F and receives F. The insurance company will break even too, as it takes the opposite position. Again, this is a time inconsistent problem, and this is the only sub-game perfect equilibrium. If we start with an oligopoly situation, then the second competitor finds itself alone in the market, producing essentially a monopoly output. Thus consumers will have lost, with lower production and higher prices than in the case of non-hedging oligopoly.
QED.
In a less extreme situation, the company can guarantee that it will produce at least Q. Then if Qx(realized)P<F the insurance company will make up the difference.
In that case, the hedging company will produce exactly Q and the analysis can proceed as in a Stackelberg case, where a follower assumes an output Q by the leader.
Clearly the implications are less extreme. We also should note that in this setting, hedging (exogenously determined) input prices is a matter of indifference to risk neutral investors.
Finally, we have assumed so far that there are no transaction costs-but the practical implication should be that there should be no significant costs involved. Obviously, costs will make hedging even less attractive.
To summarize, we conclude that risk neutral competitive firms should be indifferent to hedging input or output prices in competitive markets. In an oligopolistic setting, hedging output prices will be detrimental to the companies involved, but helpful to consumers.
Hedging total output will be detrimental to hedging firms but also detrimental to consumers.
Our MAIN HYPOTHESIS is then: Firms in non-competitive industries should not hedge outputs. In the same setting, however, they should be indifferent to input hedging.
In addition to exploring this theme empirically, we will of course include all control variables that were found to be significant by other research into hedging.
III Data and Methodology
Data
Our database consists of hand-collected data from EDGAR and accounting data extracted In what follows, we analyze input and output hedgers for two common types of risk, namely, commodity risk and 7 When research and development expenses and net operating loss carry-forward are material, firms are required to report them in their income statement. Therefore, these variables might not be reported when foreign exchange risk. The latter is much more complex in nature and out simple model may not capture the market in sufficient detail. However, we will provide a best approximation. We start with commodity risk analysis.
Identifying Input and Output Hedging for Commodity Price Risk
A key element of the analysis is identifying which firms hedge inputs and which ones hedge outputs. There is no direct reporting of the purpose of hedging. However, we can proxy for input Commodity Hedgers by selecting industries that are extensive commodity users (Input Industries) whereas output commodity hedgers should be firms that are heavy commodity sellers (Output Industries). This is not a comprehensive classification-some firms may either both buy and sell commodities or may do neither.
However, as we will show below, the classification seems to be close to reality. In order to identify input and output industries, we use the input output tables produced by the BEA. 8 We construct the ratio of commodities produced by the total of commodity utilized for each industry to measure the likelihood of hedging output (versus input) commodity price risk.
An industry which has a high ratio is identified as an output industry (a seller of commodities) whereas an industry with a low ratio is identified as an input industry. For example, the electric power generation, transmission, and distribution industry has a ratio of 3.09 (electricity is a commodity that can be hedged) whereas the automobile manufacturing industry, which is a heavy user of commodities, has a ratio of 1.33. Indeed, it immaterial, and thus would be missing in the Compustat database (see, for instance, Loughran and Ritter, 1997).
is common practice for firms in the electric power generation industry to hedge against electricity price risk (i.e. the output price risk) while for firms in the automobile industry hedge against steel price risk (i.e. the input price risk).
Naturally, this is a rather rough proxy, therefore we use the extreme quartiles in most of our analysis.
Identifying Input and Output Hedging for Currency Rate Risk
We identify Input and Output Currency Hedging by selecting firms that have a large proportion of foreign assets (input) or a large proportion of foreign sales (output).
Currency hedgers with a large proportion of foreign assets are more likely to hedge their inputs; while those with a large proportion of foreign sales are more likely to hedge their output. We define input hedgers (output hedgers) as firms in the upper quartile of our sample sorted by the ratio of foreign assets to total assets (by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales) which use derivatives to hedge against currency risk.
IV Empirical Analysis
[Insert Table I here] Table 1 contains summary statistics. It shows that 28% of the firms in our sample hedge commodity exposure and 59% hedge currency exposure. Many of these firms have market power-in fact, the average market share is 12% ( 2009 for work on a single industry, mostly gold mining). Table 2 classifies firms which hedge commodities by market power and by input/output ratios. Our model says that optimally, hedging firms are likely to be in competitive environments and hedge inputs. Firms in non-competitive environments with significant value added, should not hedge. This preliminary analysis suggests that this is indeed the case. High market power firms tend to hedge inputs, whereas low market power firms behave very differently. Since our effect is obviously confounded by many other considerations, we look at the extreme quartiles in any classification.
[Insert Table II here]   Table 3 repeats the analysis for foreign currency hedging. Obviously, firms that have a greater foreign exposure are more likely to hedge foreign exposure, however, high market power firms tend to hedge less, consistent with our model.
[Insert Table III here]   Tables 4 and 5 below repeat the analysis in a regression context, adding the various variables found significant in other work. Our commodity regression (table 4) shows that, consistent with our model, firms that use more commodity inputs (less output) tend to hedge more, and similarly, market power diminishes the incentive to hedge. In particular, firms that have large market shares and high value added (an interaction term) hedge less, consistent with our model. In table 5, the interaction variable is negative but it is not significant. Also, we find that firms with high market shares tend to hedge more, however, in the case of foreign exposure "local" market shares may not mean much and further, the meaning of hedging within our model is more clouded in the presence of foreign exchange risk. Thus results are less significant.
[Insert Table IV here] [Insert Table V This example will show that non-competitive hedging of output is sub-optimal in a Cournot seeting. As we recall, using the notation in section 1, a Cournot equilibrium implies:
The new (risk neutral) firm optimization problem is:
The FOC of the firm optimization problem will characterize the reaction function:
Thus,
Again, we will assume some numerical values so as to provide a simple solution. If we assume that the cost (E(r)=0, and that E (θ) = 120, we easily solve for the Cournot quantity, qi = qj = 40. The equilibrium price is 40 as well. Each firm earns a profit of 40 x 40 = 1600. Now, assume that one of the firms hedges its inputs. This implies that in equation (2) and (3) E(r) is replaced by a known r. Since the firm has no control over input prices and is risk neutral, there will be no effect on its decision variable, which is the quantity produced.
Consider however, what happens if the firm hedges its output prices. 9 In that case, θ will become a fixed number, say P independent of the production of the other party.
Therefore the optimization problem in equation (1) for the hedging party becomes:
Max (P x qi -r x qi 2 )
Thus P= 2rq and simply, q = P/2r (4)
In the simple numerical example we provided, then, as in the case of a Stackeleberg equilibrium (which is more interesting in this context), we reach a corner solution (since the MC is zero). Thus, the hedging firm will again saturate the market at 120 units. If it hedges at the Cournot price of 40, then it will be owed 4800 from the insurance company, which will charge as much upfront. The second competitor will leave the market. Again, consumers will gain, firms will lose and the insurance company breaks even. It is trivial to see that if the second company hedges as well, then the situation will revert to a Bertrand competition, as discussed in the Stackelberg case, and then, again, the competitors lose, the insurance company breaks even, and the consumers gain. 9 For simplicity we will assume that inputs are hedged too. 
